genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and ethnic cleansing. 0000006229 00000 n "Game Theory for International Accords." The stag hunt problem originated with philosopher Jean-Jacques Rousseau in his Discourse on Inequality. 0000000696 00000 n In Exercises 252525 through 323232, f(x)f(x)f(x) is a probability density function for a particular random variable XXX. The 18th century political philosopher Jean-Jacques Rousseau famously described a dilemma that arises when a group of hunters sets out in search of a stag: To catch the prized male deer, they must cooperate, waiting quietly in the woods for its arrival. In Just War Theory, what is the doctrine of double effect? (5OP,&|#5Y9/yU'4x r+g\t97ASNgQ+Oh iCcKzCx7<=nZefYt|.OPX:'.&|=_Ml_I{]+Mr`h+9UeovX.C; =a #/ q_/=02Q0U>#|Lod. 9i The paper proceeds as follows. Table 1. [5] Stuart Armstrong, Nick Bostrom, & Carl Shulman, Racing to the precipice: a model of artificial intelligence development, AI and Society 31, 2(2016): 201206. For example, international sanctions involve cooperation against target countries (Martin, 1992a; Drezner, . One example payoff structure that results in a Chicken game is outlined in Table 11. PxF`4f$CN*}S -'2Y72Dl0%^JOG?Y,XT@ dF6l]+$.~Qrjj}46.#Z x^iyY2)/c lLU[q#r)^X [41] AI, being a dual-use technology, does not lend itself to unambiguously defensive (or otherwise benign) investments. b Type of game model and prospect of coordination. As a result, there is no conflict between self-interest and mutual benefit, and the dominant strategy of both actors would be to defect. This table contains a representation of a payoff matrix. As a result, it is important to consider deadlock as a potential model that might explain the landscape of AI coordination. See Carl Shulman, Arms Control and Intelligence Explosions, 7th European Conference on Computing and Philosophy, Bellaterra, Spain, July 24, 2009: 6. International Relations, This is why international tradenegotiationsare often tense and difficult. endstream endobj 1 0 obj <> endobj 2 0 obj [/PDF/Text] endobj 3 0 obj <> endobj 8 0 obj <> endobj 9 0 obj <>stream As stated before, achieving a scenario where both actors perceive to be in a Stag Hunt is the most desirable situation for maximizing safety from an AI catastrophe, since both actors are primed to cooperate and will maximize their benefits from doing so. Huntington[37] makes a distinction between qualitative arms races (where technological developments radically transform the nature of a countrys military capabilities) and quantitative arms races (where competition is driven by the sheer size of an actors arsenal). This table contains a sample ordinal representation of a payoff matrix for a Stag Hunt game. December 5, 2010 at 2:49 pm. These are a few basic examples of modeling IR problems with game theory. Within these levels of analysis, there are different theories that have could be considered. Under the assumption that actors have a combination of both competing and common interests, those actors may cooperate when those common interests compel such action. @scR^}C$I3v95p6S'34Y1rar{SQ!#fzHBM6 K4m|OOpa7rB'~Y(A|'vh=ziN/quu~6,{Q [28] Armstrong et al., Racing to the precipice: a model of artificial intelligence development.. In international relations, countries are the participants in the stag hunt. Especially as prospects of coordinating are continuous, this can be a promising strategy to pursue with the support of further landscape research to more accurately assess payoff variables and what might cause them to change. [21] Jackie Snow, Algorithms are making American inequality worse, MIT Technology Review, January 26, 2018, https://www.technologyreview.com/s/610026/algorithms-are-making-american-inequality-worse/; The Boston Consulting Group & Sutton Trust, The State of Social mobility in the UK, July 2017, https://www.suttontrust.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/07/BCGSocial-Mobility-report-full-version_WEB_FINAL-1.pdf. This can be facilitated, for example, by a state leader publicly and dramatically expressing understanding of danger and willingness to negotiate with other states to achieve this. Every country operates selfishly in the international order. [31] Executive Office of the President National Science and Technology Council: Committee on Technology, Preparing for the Future of Artificial Intelligence, Executive Office of the President of the United States (October 2016), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/whitehouse_files/microsites/ostp/NSTC/preparing_for_the_future_of_ai.pdf; Artificial Intelligence, Automation, and the Economy Executive Office of the President of the United States (December 2016), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/whitehouse.gov/files/documents/Artificial-Intelligence-Automation-Economy.PDF. If all the hunters work together, they can kill the stag and all eat. Despite the damage it could cause, the impulse to go it alone has never been far off, given the profound uncertainties that define the politics of any war-torn country. They can cheat on the agreement and hope to gain more than the first nation, but if the both cheat, they both do very poorly. Instead, each hunter should separately choose the more ambitious and far more rewarding goal of getting the stag, thereby giving up some autonomy in exchange for the other hunter's cooperation and added might. [38] Michael D. Intriligator & Dagobert L. Brito, Formal Models of Arms Races, Journal of Peace Science 2, 1(1976): 7788. There is no certainty that the stag will arrive; the hare is present. [15] Sam Byford, AlphaGo beats Lee Se-dol again to take Google DeepMind Challenge series, The Verge, March 12, 2016, https://www.theverge.com/2016/3/12/11210650/alphago-deepmind-go-match-3-result. [47] look at different policy responses to arms race de-escalation and find that the model or game that underlies an arms race can affect the success of policies or strategies to mitigate or end the race. [30], Today, government actors have already expressed great interest in AI as a transformative technology. c [44] Thomas C. Schelling & Morton H. Halperin, Strategy and Arms Control. [32] Notably, discussions among U.S. policymakers to block Chinese investment in U.S. AI companies also began at this time.[33]. An example of the game of Stag Hunt can be illustrated by neighbours with a large hedge that forms the boundary between their properties. This section defines suggested payoffs variables that impact the theory and simulate the theory for each representative model based on a series of hypothetical scenarios. I refer to this as the AI Coordination Problem. Finally, there are a plethora of other assuredly relevant factors that this theory does not account for or fully consider such as multiple iterations of game playing, degrees of perfect information, or how other diplomacy-affecting spheres (economic policy, ideology, political institutional setup, etc.) Sharp's consent theory of power is the most well articulated connection between nonviolent action and power theory, yet it has some serious shortcomings, especially in dealing with systems not fitting a ruler-subject dichotomy, such as capitalism, bureaucracy, and patriarchy. This situation is often seen as a useful analogy for many kinds of social cooperation, such as international agreements on climate change.[1]. For example, suppose we have a prisoner's dilemma as pictured in Figure 3. %%EOF If, by contrast, the prospect of a return to anarchy looms, trust erodes and short-sighted self-interest wins the day. In the Prisoner's Dilemma, in contrast, despite the fact that both players cooperating is Pareto efficient, the only pure Nash equilibrium is when both players choose to defect. Although most authors focus on the prisoner's dilemma as the game that best represents the problem of social cooperation, some authors believe that the stag hunt represents an equally (or more) interesting context in which to study cooperation and its problems (for an overview see Skyrms 2004). It truly takes a village, to whom this paper is dedicated. Here, we have the formation of a modest social contract. One significant limitation of this theory is that it assumes that the AI Coordination Problem will involve two key actors. Indeed, this gives an indication of how important the Stag Hunt is to International Relations more generally. 0 International Relations of Asia & US Foreign Policy. David Hume provides a series of examples that are stag hunts. Image: The Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance Division at the Combined Air Operations Center at Al Udeid Air Base, Qatar. The field of international relations has long focused on states as the most important actors in global politics. The real peril of a hasty withdrawal of U.S. troops from Afghanistan, though, can best be understood in political, not military, terms. An example of the payoff matrix for the stag hunt is pictured in Figure 2. Half a stag is better than a brace of rabbits, but the stag will only be brought down with a . .more Dislike Share Noah Zerbe 6.48K subscribers The stag may not pass every day, but the hunters are reasonably certain that it will come. Here, values are measured in utility. Meanwhile, both actors can still expect to receive the anticipated harm that arises from a Coordination Regime [P_(h|A or B) (AB)h_(A or B)]. Finally, if both sides defect or effectively choose not to enter an AI Coordination Regime, we can expect their payoffs to be expressed as follows: The benefit that each actor can expect to receive from this scenario is solely the probability that they achieve a beneficial AI times each actors perceived benefit of receiving AI (without distributional considerations): P_(b|A) (A)b_Afor Actor A and P_(b|B) (B)b_Bfor Actor B. It comes with colossal opportunities, but also threats that are difficult to predict. startxref The matrix above provides one example. Moreover, the AI Coordination Regime is arranged such that Actor B is more likely to gain a higher distribution of AIs benefits. The dilemma is that if one hunter waits, he risks one of his fellows killing the hare for himself, sacrificing everyone else. Interestingly enough, the Stag Hunt theory can be used to describe social contracts within society, with the contract being the one to hunt the stag or achieve mutual benefit. Orcas cooperatively corral large schools of fish to the surface and stun them by hitting them with their tails. 0000002555 00000 n If the regime allows for multilateral development, for example, the actors might agree that whoever reaches AI first receives 60% of the benefit, while the other actor receives 40% of the benefit. What is the so-called 'holy trinity' of peacekeeping? So far, the readings discussed have commented on the unique qualities of technological or qualitative arms races. [13] And impressive victories over humans in chess by AI programs[14] are being dwarfed by AIs ability to compete with and beat humans at exponentially more difficult strategic endeavors like the games of Go[15] and StarCraft. What should Franks do? This is what I will refer to as the AI Coordination Problem. The stag hunt problem originated with philosopher Jean-Jacques Rousseau in his Discourse on Inequality. Here, both actors demonstrate high uncertainty about whether they will develop a beneficial or harmful AI alone (both Actors see the likelihood as a 50/50 split), but they perceive the potential benefits of AI to be slightly greater than the potential harms. Both actors see the potential harms from developing AI to be significant greater than the potential benefits, but expect that cooperating to develop AI could still result in a positive benefit for both parties. [58] Downs et al., Arms Races and Cooperation, 143-144. Finally, in the game of chicken, two sides race to collision in the hopes that the other swerves from the path first. [49] For example, see Glenn H. Snyder Prisoners Dilemma and Chicken Models in International Politics, International Studies Quarterly 15, 1(1971): 66103 and Downs et al., Arms Races and Cooperation., [50] Snyder, Prisoners Dilemma and Chicken Models in International Politics., [51] Snyder, Prisoners Dilemma and Chicken Models in International Politics.. Table 4. Downs et al. This may not amount to a recipe for good governance, but it has meant the preservation of a credible bulwark against state collapse. Here, I also examine the main agenda of this paper: to better understand and begin outlining strategies to maximize coordination in AI development, despite relevant actors varying and uncertain preferences for coordination. Most events in IR are not mutually beneficial, like in the Battle of the Sexes. In the event that both actors are in a Stag Hunt, all efforts should be made to pursue negotiations and persuade rivals of peaceful intent before the window of opportunity closes. Another proposed principle of rationality ("maximin") suggests that I ought to consider the worst payoff I could obtain under any course of action, and choose that action that maximizes . Here, both actors demonstrate varying uncertainty about whether they will develop a beneficial or harmful AI alone, but they both equally perceive the potential benefits of AI to be greater than the potential harms. The Nash equilibrium for each nation is to cheat, so it would be irrational to do otherwise. [30] Greg Allen and Taniel Chan, Artificial Intelligence and National Security. Report for Harvard Kennedy School: Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, July 2017, https://www.belfercenter.org/sites/default/files/files/publication/AI%20NatSec%20-%20final.pdf: 71-110. From that moment on, the tenuous bonds keeping together the larger band of weary, untrusting hunters will break and the stag will be lost. Nations are able to communicate with each other freely, something that is forbidden in the traditional PD game. [10] AI expert Andrew Ng says AI is the new electricity | Disrupt SF 2017, TechCrunch Disrupt SF 2017, TechCrunch, September 20, 2017, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uSCka8vXaJc. The academic example is the Stag Hunt. 0000003265 00000 n In the stag hunt, two hunters must each decide whether to hunt the stag together or hunt rabbits alone. \wb94W(F}pYY"[17/x(K+jf+M)S_3ZP7~Nj\TgTId=/o7Mx{a[ K} The closestapproximationof this in International Relations are universal treaties, like the KyotoProtocolenvironmental treaty. To be sustained, a regime of racial oppression requires cooperation. Payoff matrix for simulated Stag Hunt. In the stag hunt, what matters is trust Can actors trust that the other will follow through Depends on what they believe about each other, What actors pursue hinges on how likely the other actor is to follow through What is Game Theory theory of looking strategic interaction [1] Kelly Song, Jack Ma: Artificial intelligence could set off WWIII, but humans will win, CNBC, June 21, 2017, https://www.cnbc.com/2017/06/21/jack-ma-artificial-intelligence-could-set-off-a-third-world-war-but-humans-will-win.html. Still, predicting these values and forecasting probabilities based on information we do have is valuable and should not be ignored solely because it is not perfect information. You note that the temptation to cheat creates tension between the two trading nations, but you could phrase this much more strongly: theoretically, both players SHOULD cheat. Table 7. Scholars of civil war have argued, for example, that peacekeepers can preserve lasting cease-fires by enabling warring parties to cooperate with the knowledge that their security will be guaranteed by a third party. Advanced AI technologies have the potential to provide transformative social and economic benefits like preventing deaths in auto collisions,[17] drastically improving healthcare,[18] reducing poverty through economic bounty,[19] and potentially even finding solutions to some of our most menacing problems like climate change.[20]. For example, Stag Hunts are likely to occur when the perceived harm of developing a harmful AI is significantly greater than the perceived benefit that comes from a beneficial AI. On the face of it, the USSR Swerved, but I believe that both sides actually made concessions, although the US made theirs later on, to save face. Additionally, this model accounts for an AI Coordination Regime that might result in variable distribution of benefits for each actor. [48] Denise Garcia and Monica Herz, Preventive Action in World Politics, Global Policy 7, 3(2016): 370379. In this model, each actors incentives are not fully aligned to support mutual cooperation and thus should present worry for individuals hoping to reduce the possibility of developing a harmful AI. 75 0 obj <>stream [22] Julia Angwin, Jeff Larson, Surya Mattu, and Lauren Kirchner, Machine Bias, ProPublica, May 23, 2016 https://www.propublica.org/article/machine-bias-risk-assessments-in-criminal-sentencing. However, in Deadlock, the prospect of both actors defecting is more desirable than both actors cooperating. The second technology revolution caused World War II. Here if they all act together they can successfully reproduce, but success depends on the cooperation of many individual protozoa. Why do trade agreements even exist? In the same vein, Sorenson[39] argues that unexpected technological breakthroughs in weaponry raise instability in arms races. Those who play it safe will choose What is the difference between 'negative' and 'positive' peace? Robert J Aumann, "Nash Equilibria are not Self-Enforcing," in Economic Decision Making: Games, Econometrics and Optimisation (Essays in Honor of Jacques Dreze), edited by J. J. Gabszewicz, J.-F. Richard, and L. Wolsey, Elsevier Science Publishers, Amsterdam, 1990, pp. This makes the risk twofold; the risk that the stag does not appear, and the risk that another hunter takes the kill. The question becomes, why dont they always cheat? One hunter can catch a hare alone with less effort and less time, but it is worth far less than a stag and has much less meat. The remainder of this subsection looks at numerical simulations that result in each of the four models and discusses potential real-world hypotheticals these simulations might reflect. Two, three, four hours pass, with no trace. I introduce the example of the Stag Hunt Gamea short, effective, and easy-to-use activity that simulates Jean-Jacques Rousseau's political philosophy. As a result, this tradeoff between costs and benefits has the potential to hinder prospects for cooperation under an AI Coordination Regime. A great example of chicken in IR is the Cuban Missile Crisis. Rabbits come in the form of different opportunities for short-term gain by way of graft, electoral fraud, and the threat or use of force. For example, can the structure of distribution impact an actors perception of the game as cooperation or defection dominated (if so, should we focus strategic resources on developing accountability strategies that can effectively enforce distribution)? f(x)={323(4xx2)0if0x4otherwise. Payoff matrix for simulated Chicken game. As such, it will be useful to consider each model using a traditional normal-form game setup as seen in Table 1. The matrix above provides one example. For example, in a scenario where the United States and Russia are competing to be the one to land on the moon first, the stag hunt would allow the two countries to work together to achieve this goal when they would have gone their separate ways and done the lunar landing on their own. Table 9. If security increases cant be distinguished as purely defensive, this decreases instability. What are some good examples of coordination games? However, a hare is seen by all hunters moving along the path. 0000001656 00000 n Each can individually choose to hunt a stag or hunt a hare. [18] Deena Zaidi, The 3 most valuable applications of AI in health care, VentureBeat, April 22, 2018, https://venturebeat.com/2018/04/22/the-3-most-valuable-applications-of-ai-in-health-care/. The game is a prototype of the social contract. endstream endobj 76 0 obj <>stream I discuss in this final section the relevant policy and strategic implications this theory has on achieving international AI coordination, and assess the strengths and limitations of the theory outlined above in practice. 4 thoughts on " The Six-Party Talks as a Game Theoretic 'Stag-Hunt' (2): For example international relations-if the people made international decisions stag hunt, chicken o International relations is a perfect example of an Cooperation under the security dilemma. Meanwhile, the harm that each actor can expect to receive from an AI Coordination Regime consists of both the likelihood that the actor themselves will develop a harmful AI times that harm, as well as the expected harm of their opponent developing a harmful AI. Depending on which model is present, we can get a better sense of the likelihood of cooperation or defection, which can in turn inform research and policy agendas to address this. The Stag Hunt UCI School of Social Sciences, Example of stag hunt in international relations, on Example of stag hunt in international relations, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stag_Hunt_Mosaic, example of application letter for sales representative, Example of selection criteria planning and organising, Example sentences with the word detrimental, Manual de access 2010 avanzado pdf en espanol gratis. When looking at these components in detail, however, we see that the anticipated benefits and harms are linked to whether the actors cooperate or defect from an AI Coordination Regime. Additional readings provide insight on arms characteristics that impact race dynamics. In this article, we employ a class of symmetric, ordinal 2 2 games including the frequently studied Prisoner's Dilemma, Chicken, and Stag Hunt to model the stability of the social contract in the face of catastrophic changes in social relations. [6] Moreover, speculative accounts of competition and arms races have begun to increase in prominence[7], while state actors have begun to take steps that seem to support this assessment. This iterated structure creates an incentive to cooperate; cheating in the first round significantly reduces the likelihood that the other player will trust one enough to attempt to cooperate in the future. In the context of the AI Coordination Problem, a Stag Hunt is the most desirable outcome as mutual cooperation results in the lowest risk of racing dynamics and associated risk of developing a harmful AI. Members of the Afghan political elite have long found themselves facing a similar trade-off. The primary difference between the Prisoners Dilemma and Chicken, however, is that both actors failing to cooperate is the least desired outcome of the game. In addition to the example suggested by Rousseau, David Hume provides a series of examples that are stag hunts. 695 0 obj As an advocate of structural realism, Gray[45] questions the role of arms control, as he views the balance of power as a self-sufficient and self-perpetuating system of international security that is more preferable. Read about me, or email me. It is not clear whether the errors were deliberate or accidental. This allows for coordination, and enables players to move from the strategy with the lowest combined payoff (both cheat) to the strategy with the highest combined payoff (both cooperate). Here, values are measured in utility. Moreover, the usefulness of this model requires accurately gauging or forecasting variables that are hard to work with. [2] Tom Simonite, Artificial Intelligence Fuels New Global Arms Race, Wired., September 8, 2017, https://www.wired.com/story/for-superpowers-artificial-intelligence-fuels-new-global-arms-race/. Solving this problem requires more understanding of its dynamics and strategic implications before hacking at it with policy solutions. Both actors are more optimistic in Actor Bs chances of developing a beneficial AI, but also agree that entering an AI Coordination Regime would result in the highest chances of a beneficial AI. Some have accused rivals of being Taliban sympathizers while others have condemned their counterparts for being against peace. Outline a basic understanding of what the discipline of International Relations is about, and Jean Jacques Rousseau (1712-1778): Parable of the Stag Hunt. For example, if the two international actors cooperate with one another, we can expect some reduction in individual payoffs if both sides agree to distribute benefits amongst each other. As of 2017, there were 193 member-states of the international system as recognized by the United Nations. At the same time, there are great harms and challenges that arise from AIs rapid development. 0000002790 00000 n A classic game theoretic allegory best demonstrates the various incentives at stake for the United States and Afghan political elites at this moment. I will apply them to IR and give an example for each. Structural Conflict Prevention refers to a compromosde of long term intervention that aim to transform key socioeconomic, political and institional factors that could lead to conflict. NUMBER OF PAGES 65 14. September 21, 2015 | category: Under this principle, parties to an armed conflict must always distinguish between civilians and civilian objects on the one hand, and combatants and military targets on the other. The hunters hide and wait along a path.
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